Bad Memory: Evaluating Prompt Injection Risks from Memory in Agentic Systems

AuthorsSoham Gadgil, David Alexander, Sai Sunku, Franziska Roesner

arXiv 20262026

TL;DR

Bad Memory uses a sandboxed multi-session workspace to show that persistent file-based memory enables durable prompt injection with attack success rates up to 100%.

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THE PROBLEM

Persistent memory turns prompt injection into a durable compromise

Bad Memory shows that payloads planted in trusted memory files can successfully attack current and future sessions, with attack success and persistence varying substantially.

When agents like Claude Code and Codex treat CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, and behaviors.md as trusted instructions, malicious rules can cause credential exfiltration, unauthorized tool use, and brand targeting across multiple sessions.

HOW IT WORKS

Sandboxed synthetic workspace and multi session probe protocol

Bad Memory builds a synthetic workspace with CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, core/behaviors.md, and knowledge/*.md plus a py graph algorithms project to simulate persistent agent memory.

Think of Bad Memory as a controlled lab where agent memory files act like a long lived configuration disk, while each probe session is a fresh RAM context that reloads those instructions.

By combining Probe Session, Stabilization Session, and multi probe sequences, Bad Memory reveals how memory based prompt injection persists and compounds in ways a plain context window cannot capture.

DIAGRAM

Multi session attack and persistence flow

This diagram shows how Bad Memory composes Probe and Stabilization Sessions to test attack success and payload persistence across sessions.

DIAGRAM

Evaluation pipeline for Bad Memory

This diagram shows how Bad Memory constructs experiments over agents, models, adversarial goals, and attack vectors to measure attack success and persistence.

PROCESS

How Bad Memory Handles a Multi session Experiment

  1. 01

    Synthetic workspace construction

    Bad Memory sets up CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, core/behaviors.md, identity.md, and knowledge directories plus py graph algorithms to emulate a persistent user workspace.

  2. 02

    Threat model and attack payload planting

    Bad Memory assumes adversary control over a persistent workspace file and embeds credential exfiltration, unauthorized tool use, or brand targeting rules into specific memory files.

  3. 03

    Probe Session and Stabilization Session execution

    Bad Memory runs Probe Session and Stabilization Session sequences, giving benign tasks that reveal whether planted payloads affect behavior and whether memory gets rewritten.

  4. 04

    Attack success and persistence measurement

    Bad Memory computes attack success rate and persistence rate across Claude Opus 4.7, Claude Haiku 4.5, GPT 5.2, and GPT 5.5 for single probes, repeated attacks, and stacked attacks.

KEY CONTRIBUTIONS

Key Contributions

  • 01

    Synthetic workspace for memory based prompt injection

    Bad Memory designs a sandboxed workspace with CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, core/behaviors.md, and knowledge/*.md to safely study how persistent files influence agent behavior across sessions.

  • 02

    Multi session evaluation protocol

    Bad Memory introduces Probe Session and Stabilization Session sequences to measure both within session attack success and cross session payload persistence for memory based attacks.

  • 03

    Empirical analysis across agents and models

    Bad Memory reports attack success rates up to 100% and persistence rates up to 100% across Claude Code and Codex, revealing distinct behaviors for credential exfiltration, unauthorized tool use, and brand targeting.

RESULTS

By the Numbers

Single probe mean ASR Haiku 4.5

63.3%

+33.3 percentage points over Opus 4.7 mean ASR 30.0%

Single probe mean ASR GPT 5.5

60.0%

+36.7 percentage points over GPT 5.2 mean ASR 23.3%

Same attack mean persistence Opus 4.7

96.7%

Highest persistence despite low mean ASR 26.7%

Different attacks mean persistence GPT 5.2

23.3%

Lowest persistence among evaluated models

Bad Memory evaluates attack success rate and persistence rate on a synthetic workspace with credential exfiltration, unauthorized tool use, and brand targeting tasks. These numbers show that memory based prompt injection can both succeed frequently and persist even when agents sometimes refuse individual malicious actions.

BENCHMARK

By the Numbers

Bad Memory evaluates attack success rate and persistence rate on a synthetic workspace with credential exfiltration, unauthorized tool use, and brand targeting tasks. These numbers show that memory based prompt injection can both succeed frequently and persist even when agents sometimes refuse individual malicious actions.

BENCHMARK

Mean attack success rate across models for single probe sessions

Mean Attack Success Rate (ASR) across three adversarial goals in single probe experiments.

KEY INSIGHT

The Counterintuitive Finding

Bad Memory finds that Claude Opus 4.7 has the lowest mean attack success rate of 18.3% in stacked attack sequences but the highest mean persistence rate of 93.3%.

This is surprising because one might expect a resistant agent to aggressively clean memory; instead, Opus often flags attacks yet leaves malicious rules in place, exposing future sessions and weaker models.

WHY IT MATTERS

What this unlocks for the field

Bad Memory makes clear that persistent file based memory must be treated as a first class security surface, not uniformly trusted context.

Builders can now design agent runtimes that gate edits to CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, and behaviors.md, add memory validation at session start, and separate low trust knowledge from high impact behavioral rules.

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